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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN .T. ELLISON, HARRY G. 1 
ANDERSON and \VILLIAl\l A. I 
DAYVSON, dba Famous Foods, a I 
limited partnership, and BILL A. !: 
BA YES, administrator with the \Vill t 
annexed of the estate of Harrv G. 
~'tnderson, deceased, · \ 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
L. 13. JOHNSON and L YlHAN E. 
PASSEY, 
Defendants and Appellants. f 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 
10550 
The Respondents agree with the Statement of 
Fads set forth in Appellants' Brief with the exception 
of the statement that one of the plaintiffs (Lorin J. 
Ellison) represented to the defendants that the monthly 
payments of Five :Hundred Forty-ffre Dollars 
(*54..).00) for twenty-nine (29) months and Four 
1 
Hundred Forty-five Dollars ( $445.00) per month 
thereafter would pay out the agreement during the terrn 
of the Robinson lease. The record discloses ( R. 69) tliai 
the defendants offered to proye by the testimony of 
the defendant, Lyman Passey, that .J-lr. Ellison rep-
resented to him that the agreement sued upon would bt 
paid out by the end of the Robinson lease. This, of 
course, is Mr. Passey's statement and is not confirmed 
by Mr. Ellison. In fact, the trial court (R. G6) sug-
gested that counsel for defendants call the plaintiff, 1 
Mr. Ellison, as his first witness if they expected to prore 
1 
mutual mistake. Instead, counsel offered only the testi-
mony of defendant, Lyman E. Passey. 
We also call attention to the proffered proof of 
the defendant Passey (R. 69), that .Mr. Ellison, with 
the approval of Mr. Passey, changed the monthly figure 
by increasing the amount and initialed it by the side of 
the agreement. An examination of the agreement (R. 2) 
(Pl. Ex. I, R. 63) discloses that the figure $545.00 mts 
blurred and the last figure "5" was made plainer b>· 
inserting the figure in ink above the blurred figure. The 
only change thus made was a correction of a $j.OU 
typographical error (R. 70). 
It is the contention of the Respondents that thes'c 
exceptions to the facts, as stated by the Appellants. ar2 
minor and have no bearing on the decision in this cas ~ 
and that the trial court was correct in granting its Sum· 
marv J ud<J'ment Sua S ponte on the pleadings and state· 
• b 
ments of counsel. 
2 
STATEMENT O.F POINTS 
1. Judgment in this case is not required to Le 
~upported by Findings of .Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
it being in the nature of a Summary Judgment awl the: 
fact that findings and conclusions were not filed until 
ni11etee11 ( 19) days after the judgment is harmless error. 
~. On the basis of the pleadings, answers to inter-
rogatories and statement of counsel, the trial court wa~; 
justified and not in error in failing to find a mutual 
nmtake and failure of consideration. 
3. Parol evidence was inadmissable to vary the 
terms of the written instrument. 
ARGUMENT 
1. JUDG.MENT IN THIS CASE IS N"OT 
REQCIRED TO BE SUPPORTED BY FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LA,Y, IT BEING IN THE NATURE O.F A 
SC~BIARY JUDGMENT AND THE FACT 
THAT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
'VERE NOT FILED UNTIL NINETEEX 
(10) DAYS AFTER THE JUDGl\IENT IS 
IL-\RMLESS ERROR. 
Rule 52 (a) of the Vtah Rules of Civil Procedure 
pro,,itles that findings are unnecessary on decisions or 
motions under Rule 12 or 56 (Summary Judgment). 
3 
It is a matter of record that the judgment iu this 
case was in the nature of a summary judgment base1; 
on the pleadings and statement of counsel and y1·ouJ11 
come within the scope of Rule 56 thereby making tht: 
filing of findings and conclusions unnecessary. The 
pleadings, including the answers to the written inter-
rogatories and statement of counsel clearly indicarc 
that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. i 
Failure to make findings in such a case is not reversible 
error if, when found, they must necessarily have bee11 
adverse to the appellant. Groome v. Ogden City, 10 
Utah 54, 37 Pac. 90; Petty v. St. George Garage, 60 
Utah 126, 206 Pac. 720. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"No error in either the admission or the exclu-
sion of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or any of the parties is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order unless ref us al to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. The court at every stage of 
the proceedings must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceedings which does not a:ff el:t 
the substantial rights of the parties." (Emphas1~ 
added.) 
In this case the findings were not filed until nine-
teen ( 19) days after the judgment and then onl~· on 
suggestion of Counsel for Defendant. Did this failure 
affect the substantial rights of the parties? 1iV e think 
not. This court has held, under a rule similar to Rule 61, 
4 
that the failure to make findings under facts similar to 
those in the present case is harmless error and not 
grounds fur reversal. In Re: Love's Estate, 75 Utah 34~ •. 
:285 Pac. 299; Snyder v. Allen, 51 Utah 291, l(H) Pac. 
945. 
~. ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEAD-
INGS, ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES 
AXD STATEMENT OF COUNSEL, THE 
TlUAL COURT 'i\TAS JUSTIFIED AND NOT 
IX ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND A _MU-
'1TAL i\IISTAKE AND FAILURE OF CON-
SIDERATION. 
The facts in this case are clear and uncon trovertcd 
except for the minor differences set forth in the State-
ment of Facts. They are as follows: 
On the 1st day of November, 1955, the plaintiffs, 
us sellers, and the defendants, as buyers, entered into 
a simple unequivocal bargain and sale agreement. This 
agreement provided that the plaintiffs sold to the defen-
dants their lease on that certain store building located 
at 13~2 East 21st South in Salt Lake City, Utah, to-
w·ther with market equipment described in the inventory 
attached to the agreement. This agreement could htn-c 
been more aptly described as a sales agreement rather 
tha11 a lease agreement. The defendant buyers agreed 
tii p:t)' for said lease, i1wentory and equipment the sum 
of Thirty-nine 'l'housand Six Hundred Fifty and 
9:2 mo Dollars ($39,650.92), payable Five I-Iundred 
5 
Dollars ($500.00) on the lst day of November, 195.i, 
Five Hundred Forty-five Dollars ($545.00) on the ht 
day of each month thereafter for a period of twenty 




month until the balance of said sum, together with.inter-
est, as hereinafter specified, has been paid." ( Emphasi
1 
added.) 
The agreement also provides: 
"The buyers accept all of said propertr in ih 
present condition and agree to assume tl;e lease 
on said premises with the owner thereof and to 
be bound by all of the terms and conditions there-
of as the seller has been heretofore." (Emphasis 
added.) (R. 44-45.) 
In accord with the terms of this agreement, the 
plaintiffs delivered the fixtures, inventory and lease to 
the defendants and the defendants made payments to 
the plaintiffs for over nine ( 9) years and at the same 
time made monthly payments to the landlord (Doctor 
Robinson) for the rental on said property. At the time 
their lease expired in February of 1963, the defendants 
were notified by the landlord that he would be unable 
to renew their lease because the State Road Commissioll 
was taking the property for a road-widening project. 
The defendants held over for two (2) months beyond 
the end of their lease and were then forced to ,-acatc. 
At this time, there remained a balance owing to th· 
plaintiffs of Five Thousand Seventeen and 25'100 Dol-
lars ($5,017.25) together with interest. The abm·e fa~!. 
' J 
are admitted by the def end ants and are not contro,·eneri. 
6 
To justify their refusal to pay the amount admittedly 
remaining unpaid under the agreement (R. 18 and R. 
:20), the defendants claimed there was a mutual mistake 
and failure of consideration inasmuch as they were led 
to believe by one of the plaintiffs (Mr. Ellison) that the 
installment payments would pay the agreement out by 
the end of' the lease which they purchased from the 
plaintiffs. 
There are numerous decisions by this court, includ-
ing several by the present membership of the court, 
holding that a contract can be reformed for mutual 
mistake but setting down certain tests which must be 
met before reformation is allowed. 
A very scholarly discussion of these questions has 
been made by .Mr. J. Thomas Greene in his article pub-
lished in the Utah Law Review, Vol. 7, 1961, No. 3, 
entitled "Mistake in the Utah Law of Contraots" 
(a single copy of this treatise is enclosed with Respon-
dents' brief). Mr. Greene sums up the general con-
clusions after applying the rules laid down in the numer-
ous decisions by this court as follows: 
"The well-settled general rule in Utah is that 
a mistake on the part of one party only is not 
redressable. Typical statements of the rule are 
as follows: 
"Equity will not reform a written contract 
unless the mistake is proved to be the mistake 
of both parties. 
"A contract will not be reformed for a uni-
lateral mistake. 
7 
"A mistake on one side of a unilateral mistak(' 
of fac~ is_ ground for reversal only when sud1 mi.,- 1 
take is mduced by fraud.'' Starley Y. Desen' 
Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 7-:t P.2d 1221. ' 
In the case of Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, relied 
upon by the Appellants, the facts were conclusi,·e tb.l 
a vital mistake was made by both parties and the rnurl 
stated: 
"As a matter of fact any other finding would 
have rendered an absurd result, absurd in the , 
sense that the reason for the contract known t11 
both parties would have been utterly ignored." 
Applying the above reasoning to this case, the rern·,c 
would be true. The plaintiffs and defendants entered 
into a contract for the payment of an agreed anwwr 
of money in monthly installments. There is no coutentiu11 
made by the defendants that the balance sued upoH lia~ 
been paid. Defendants' only contention is that they were 
informed by the plaintiffs that the contract vvottld pa!· 
out sooner than it did and, therefore, they arc exl'nst:d 
from paying the balance under the contract. If tlii1 
reasoning were to be followed, the result would, w1dc 1• 
the holding in the Sine v. Harper case, have been ··ab-
surd in the sense that the reason for the contract kumrn 
to both parties would have been utterly ignored.'' 
Aside from being clear and convincing, as detine'
1 
in the Harper case, the proffered evidence in this case 
indicates that no mistake was made as to the amo1111. 
owing to the plaintiffs. This court has held that i;1 tii · 
absence of some misconduct on the part of the plainfr'', 
8 
the defendants cannot be released from the consequences 
of its improvidence merely because the bargain is bur-
densome or unprofitable. Allen v. Bissinger, 62 Utah 
:226, 219 Pac. 539. 
The only excuse offered by the defendants for not 
determining the payout period prescribed under the 
eontract was as stated in the proffered testimony of the 
defendant Passey that: 
"He accepted Mr. Ellison's word as to the 
computations because, as obviously it was a very 
detailed and complicated mathematical problem 
to figure out the amortization and the amount 
would be paid on principal and interest each 
month and finally arrived at the payment of the 
amount the parties agreed to pay." (R. 69.) 
This court has also held that unilateral mistake is 
of no legal significance when documents are signed 
without reading or without ascertaining the legal con-
sequences of the document. Garff Realty v. Better 
Building, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842; Accord v. 
Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 254 P.2d 621. 
It has also been held that where the person knows 
the facts of the case but is ignorant of the legal conse-
quences, he cannot claim mutual mistake. Board of 
Education of Sevier School District v. Board of Edu-
cation of Piute School District, 85 Utah 276, 39 P.2d 
340; Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 Pac. 888. 
This court has also held in A.{fhworth v. Charles-
".t'orth, 119 Utah 650, 231 P.2d 724, at page 728, that: 
9 
"Even assuming a mistake was made br th· 
defendants, they were guilty of such carele;sne1; 
in not seeing what they should have seen aud ii; 
not obtaining readily available information tli,n 
the trial court was not obligated to relieve then: 
of their own neglect. The fault, if any, in tJij, 
case appears to fall heavily upon the shoulder, 
of the defendants." 
See also Pomeroy on Equity J urispru<lencc 851) "ff 
Fifth Edition, 1951. 
This brings us to the contention of the Appellant. 
on page 8 of their brief that the alleged mutual mistake 
of fact "required the defendants to pay rent on a build-
ing from which they had been evicted." The undisputed 
facts are that the issues sued upon in this case imolre 
a bargain and sale agreement. The plaintiff sold to the 
defendants for an agreed sum their lease, inventory and 
fixtures. The defendants paid the rent to the landlord 
(Doctor Robinson) for over nine ( 9) years until the 
lease expired. There is no mention in the agreement 
that any rents were to be paid to the plaintiffs nor were 
any paid nor was this suit brought to compel def endunts 
to pay rent on a building from which they had beeu 
evicted. This suit was brought to collect the unpaid 
balance which both parties agree remains unpaid under 
the terms of the agreement. 
The trial court was correct in finding: ( R. 67-681 
"Then you (the defendants) have got to gn 
out now because you would only have had to pa:· 
out more. If th~y hadn't macle a mistake. )'Oll 
would h;ve to ha:,'e paid more each year." 
10 
\Ve submit that under the undisputed facts in this 
rnse, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment 
Szw Spunte and that the rule quoted by Appellants from 
Bullock v. Deseret Lodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 
:zd I, 354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960), gives the Appellants 
110 support for their position. The rule quoted in this 
case is as follows : 
"A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In this case there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. The defendants agreed to pay a fixed sum 
of money in monthly installments until the account was 
paid in full. The claim of the defendants that they were 
led to believe that the contract would pay out sooner 
than it did is not a material fact and would not sustain 
a judgment in their favor. To do so would deprive the 
plaintiff's of the fruits of their bargain and would result 
in an inequity. 
3. PAROL EVIDENCE WAS INADMIS-
SIBLE TO Y ARY THE TERMS OF THE 
\VRITTEN INSTRUMENT. 
The parol evidence rule is found in 78-25-16, Utah 
Code lrnnotated, 1953. It reads as follows: 
11 
"1~h~re can be no evidence of the contents ril 
a wntmg, other than the writing itself exe . , 1
1 
in the following cases . . . . " ' · e/Ji • 
Then follows a list of exceptions, none of which apph 
to this case. · · 
The general rule under this statute has been dii· \ 
cussed in Fox Film Corporation v. Ogden Theat, 1 : 
82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294. The court in this case held. 'i 
"In the absence, of fraud or mistake, parol eri-
1 
dence is not admissable to contradict, varv or add 
to or subtract from the terms of a valid. writtell 
instrument." 
See also McCornick v. Levy, 37 Utah 134, 106 Pac. tHiO: 1 
Moran Inc. v. First Security Corp., 82 Utah 3Hi, ~± 
P.2d 384; Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erid:sen, 82 Utah 
475, 25 P.2d 952; Jones on Evidence, Second Edition. 1. 
285, Page on Contracts, Vol. 4, 2164. 
It is recognized that oral testimony ca11 be re-
ceived to correct a mistake which results in an injustict 
and to, of course, modify the parol evidence rule. Si11c 
v. Harper, supra, and Fox Film Corporation t'. O,r;dt1r 
Theatre, supra. 
However, the alleged mistakes claimed by the de-
fendants in this case do not involve a material fact, nor 
would they result in an injustice so as to bring the1'1 
within the exception of the parol evidence statute (ar'~ 1 i· 
men ts on this question are covered in Point No. 2) · 
12 
The defendants argue that because they did not 
have the use of the building beyond the term of their 
lease they were unable to operate their store and thus 
procure the means by which to pay plaintiffs the balance 
due under the contract. (R. 68). This, under the authori-
ties cited, offers no excuse. Allen v. Bissinger, supra. 
In this case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"There is no claim of misrepresentation or 
fraud against the defendant. It may well be that 
the reports proved useless and of no value to 
defendant, and that in volume and price they 
exceeded its expectations, but in the absence of 
some misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, the 
defendant cannot be relieved from the conse-
quences of its improvidence, merely because the 
bargain is burdensome and unprofitable." 
See also Fujikaya v. Sunrise Water Company, 158 
F.2d 490, 492 and A.L.R.2d 27. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no mutual mistake of any material mat-
ter which would justify the court in setting aside the 
parol evidence rule nor would any injustice result if 
the defendants were required to comply with the terms 
of their contract. On the other hand, it would be inequi-
table to permit the defendants to avoid payment of 
the sums which admittedly remain unpaid on the con-
tract sued upon. There were sufficient facts admitted 
13 
by the defendants through their pleadings, offer of proo) 
and Statement of Counsel to justify the summary judg· 
ment of the trial court and the same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'iVILLIA:J\;1 A. DA 'VSON 
2627 Nottingham 'iV ay 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
HENRY D. MOYLE, JR. 
840 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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